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Abstract—The physical layer security (PLS) of wireless net-
works has witnessed significant attention in next generation
communication systems due to its potential towards enabling
protection at signal level in dense network environments. The
growing trends towards smart mobility via sensor enabled
vehicles is transforming today’s traffic environment into Internet
of Vehicles (IoVs). Enabling PLS for IoVs would be a significant
development considering the dense vehicular network environ-
ment in the near future. In this context, this paper presents a
PLS framework for a vehicular network consisting a legitimate
receiver and an eavesdropper, both under the effect of interfering
vehicles. The double-Rayleigh fading channel is used to capture
the effect of mobility within the communication channel. The
performance is analyzed in terms of the average secrecy capacity
(ASC) and secrecy outage probability (SOP). We present the
standard expressions for the ASC and SOP in alternative forms,
to facilitate analysis in terms of the respective moment generating
function (MGF) and characteristic function of the joint fading
and interferer statistics. Closed-form expressions for the MGFs
and characteristic functions were obtained and Monte Carlo
simulations were provided to validate the results. Approximate
expressions for the ASC and SOP were also provided, for easier
analysis and insight into the effect of the network parameters.
The results attest that the performance of the considered system
was affected by the number of interfering vehicles as well as their
distances. It was also demonstrated that the system performance
closely correlates with the uncertainty in the eavesdropper’s
vehicle location.
Index Terms—Double-Rayleigh fading channels, interference
modelling, physical layer security, secrecy capacity, secrecy out-
age probability, vehicular communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE emerging concept of Intelligent Transportation Sys-tems (ITS) is envisioned to improve efficiency, reliability,
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passenger safety as well as enriched infotainment experiences
[1], [2]. A key enabler of ITS is the novel paradigm of
Internet of Vehicles (IoV), which seeks to enhance the ex-
isting capabilities of Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs)
with the Internet-of-Things (IoT) [1]. Thus, while commu-
nication in VANETs involve Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), communication in IoVs addi-
tionally include Vehicle-to-Road Side Units (V2R), Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure of Cellular Networks, Vehicle-to-Sensors (V2S),
and Vehicle to Personal Devices (V2P), relying on different
wireless communication technologies for disseminating infor-
mation [3]. Hence, we observe a growing trend towards smart
mobility via sensor enabled vehicles towards transforming
today’s traffic environment. As the number of wireless con-
nected devices and vehicles within our transportation systems
continue to increase [4], certain technical challenges, with
respect to reliable and scalable wireless transmissions for IoV
are becoming more apparent [5]. Large amounts of information
is generated within the network [1], [5], [6], sometimes up to
thousands of times of that by a person. Vehicle density is also
highly dynamic over space and time [5], with different ur-
gency requirements for information exchange. These practical
realities bring about interference concerns within the shared
spectrum and bring forth an even greater need for securing all
aspects of the network.
Although there is a growing interest in securing the avail-
ability and/or reliability of information exchange in IoV net-
works through new technologies such as blockchain [7]–[9] or
cloud services [10], nevertheless, wireless communication se-
curity can be implemented across several layers of the system.
Traditionally, one of such approaches, referred to as physical
layer security (PLS), employs the inherent characteristics of
the propagation channels, such as interference, fading and
noise to realize keyless secure transmission through signal
design and signal processing approaches [11]. The benefits
of employing PLS include less computational complexity
compared to computation-based cryptography techniques as
well as reduced challenges in distribution and management
of secret keys, especially in decentralized systems such as
IoT/IoV networks or 5G/beyond 5G heterogenous networks.
Furthermore, PLS techniques can be integrated through signal
design and resource allocation depending on the prevailing
channel conditions [12].
Performance analysis of wireless communication systems
over fading channels or in interference-limited networks with
respect to PLS have been studied in various literature. For
instance, the performance of secure cooperative systems over
correlated Rayleigh fading channels was studied in [13], while
the secrecy outage probability (SOP) over correlated com-
posite Nakagami-m/Gamma fading and the secrecy capacity
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers over Nakagami-
m channels were considered in [14] and [15], respectively.
Furthermore, the secrecy capacity in generalized fading has
been studied over κ-µ shadowed fading channels [16]–[18],
over α-µ/κ-µ and κ-µ/α-µ fading channels [19] and over
Fisher-Snedecor F composite fading channel [20]. Meanwhile,
the effect of interference on secrecy was observed in a NOMA
system in [21], examined for secrecy capacity of a cognitive
radio (CR) network in [22] and investigating for the SOP in
a Rayleigh faded channel in [23].
With respect to PLS in vehicular communications, a few
studies have been conducted in a path-loss non-fading sce-
nario, such as, in [24], where the mobility of nodes were
leveraged to improve security in a downlink multiuser net-
work and in [25] for a cooperative decode-and-forward (DF)-
based relay network. Several other studies consider various
fading models. For example, PLS of vehicular networks was
studied in double-Rayleigh and N -Nakagami fading in [26]
and [27] respectively, while a relay-assisted mobile network
in such fading channels was discussed in [28]. Addition-
ally, secrecy performance for an amplify-and-forward (AF)-
based V2I networks under Rayleigh channels was studied in
[29], secrecy performance for a DF-based V2V network over
double-Rayleigh fading channels in [30], while cooperative
AF relaying was investigated for double-Rayleigh fading in
[31], [32] and Nakagami-m fading in [33]. The significance
of investigating PLS in IoV networks is crucial due to the rapid
advancement towards autonomous and connected vehicles as
well as to avoid or minimize the associated risk of security
compromise and attacks in such networks. It has however been
observed that the effect of interference on PLS has received
less attention, even though interference is inherent within
shared networks [34] and affects the secrecy performance
[22], [23]. The issue of interference should be of particular
interest in IoV networks because of the large information
generated, as well as the requirements of the IEEE 1609.4
standard that institutes specifications suggesting the selection
of the least congested channel for data transmission [35].
Additionally, given the random nature of such networks due
to uncertain mobility and density of vehicles, the received
signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) is routinely used
as the channel quality measure along with geocasting and other
geometry-based localization techniques [36], [37].
Notwithstanding the aforementioned works that studied PLS
of wireless networks in different fading channels [13]–[20],
[22], [38]–[40] and particularly for vehicular networks in [26]–
[33], little attention has been given to the effects of interfer-
ence in PLS analysis or the effects of eavesdropper uncertainty.
In [22], [23], interference was considered on PLS and in [41]
the uncertainty of the eavesdropper location was taken into
account and shown to affect the PLS analysis. However, [22],
[23], [41] were studied for non-vehicular networks and not
considered jointly. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge,
no previous literature on vehicular communication networks
has investigated the PLS considering the joint effects of
the three parameters, i.e., fading channel, interference within
the shared network and the uncertainty of the eavesdropper
location within the shared space. In this paper, the effect of
the uncertainty of the eavesdropper location was taken into
account, by modelling its distance as a random variable (RV),
while the mobile vehicular fading channel was modelled as a
double-Rayleigh fading channel, which has been shown from
experimental measurements, to be a more appropriate model
for the high mobility of nodes in a vehicular network, rather
than the more common Rayleigh or Nakagami-m distributions
[42], [43].
Motivated by the aforementioned studies and research gap,
we investigate the PLS of an IoV network, wherein we
consider a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, within the
shared network, both under the effect of interferer vehicles,
thus, examining the dual challenges of interference and secu-
rity in IoV networks. We summarize the key contributions of
this paper as follows:
• New analysis for the combined effect of three random
parameters on a vehicular communication channel, i.e.,
channel fading, interference and eavesdropper uncer-
tainty. To the best of our knowledge, the effect of these
three parameters has not been considered jointly for
vehicular communication networks.
• The capacity analysis of the system under interference
constraints was simplified by expressing the logarithm
of the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) in a
form that presents the random variables (RVs) as a linear
sum in an exponent. This allows easier analysis of the
secrecy capacity in the presence of an eavesdropper, in
terms of the joint moment generating function (MGF) of
the RVs. Closed-form expressions for the MGFs of the
joint interference and fading channels were obtained, to
facilitate the analysis of various system parameters.
• Novel expressions for the SOP were presented, by ob-
taining transformations in terms of the characteristic
functions of the joint statistics of the RVs. Closed-form
expressions for the characteristic function of the joint
interference and fading channels were obtained, which
are new, to the best of the authors’ knowledge.
• We considered a special case of uniformly distributed
interfering vehicular nodes in the system. We therefore
modelled the density of mobile nodes as a Poisson point
process (PPP) and obtained closed-form expressions for
the MGF of the joint statistics of the four random system
parameters.
• Novel closed-form approximations for the secrecy capac-
ity and high SINR regime analysis for the SOP were
derived. The approximate expressions, allow us to gain
better insights into the behavior of the considered network
scenario.
Throughout the analysis, Monte Carlo simulations are pro-
vided to verify the accuracy of the derived expressions. The
results show that the performance of the system in terms of
both the secrecy capacity and the SOP is impacted by the
presence of interfering nodes. The results further demonstrate
the effect of uncertainty in the eavesdropper’s location on the
analysis.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the system under study. Thereafter,
in Section III, we derive expressions for efficient computation
of the secrecy capacity of the network and derive the MGFs of
the SINR in closed-form, while in Section IV, we derive ex-
pressions for the SOP of the network as well as the associated
closed-form characteristic functions. Finally, in Sections V and
VI, we present the results and outline the main conclusions.
Mathematical Functions and Notations: The following
notations are used.
Notation Definition
E [·] Expectation operator




tz−1e−tdt, the gamma function
[45, Eq. (8.310)]
Γ (a, b) =
´∞
b
ta−1e−tdt, the upper incomplete
gamma function [45, Eq. (9.14.1)]
pFq (α;β; z) Generalized hypergeometric series
[45, Eq. (9.14.1)]
2F1 (α;β; γ; z) Gauss hypergeometric function [45,
Eq. (9.111)]
Kv (z) Modified Bessel function of the
second kind and v-th order [45, Eq.
(8.407)]










, the MGF of X .
MX,Y (z) =MX (z)MY (z), the joint MGF of
X and Y .
f (γ) Probability density function of γ.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a system of nodes operating in a vehicular network
as depicted in Fig. 1. We designate three nodes of interest: the
information source vehicle (S), the information destination
vehicle (D) and a passive eavesdropper1 vehicle (E). The
vehicle S transmits information to the desired vehicle D, while
E attempts to receive and decode the confidential information.
Furthermore, the presence of other vehicular nodes operating
within the same space and frequency band, results in co-
channel interference to the received signals of D and E.
Moreover, while D and E are known to lie within a certain
maximum radius rmax from S, the precise relative distances of
the V2V links are unknown during transmission, which is a
realistic assumption for a network of this nature [26], [41].
1In this context, a passive eavesdropper is a node that only gathers
information on the network, but makes no attempt to actively disrupt, tamper
or inject any information into the network. Examples of such attacks may
include ID disclosure, snooping and session hijacking. See [3] and the
references therein for details of such attacks.
Figure 1: A schematic representation of the system model for the
vehicular network under study. R is the maximum distance of interfering
nodes. rD is the source to destination distance. rE is the source to
eavesdropper distance.









hElxl + wE , (2)
where K and L denote the number of interference nodes
at D and E, respectively. x, xk and xl are the transmitted
signals by S, the k-th interferer and the l-th interferer, with
powers Ps, Pk and Pl, respectively. The terms wD and wE
indicate the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at D
and E, respectively. Without loss of generality, we denote
the power spectral density of the AWGN as N0 and equal




i , i ∈ {D,E} , is
the channel coefficient from S to the receiving vehicles D
and E, where ri is the V2V link distance, β is the path-
loss exponent and gi is the channel gain following double-






, i ∈ {D,E}, j ∈ {k, l} are the channel
coefficients between the j-th interferer at a distance rij from
the receiving node, and gij is the j-th interferer channel gain.
Based on (1) and (2), the instantaneous SINRs at D and E
are respectively given by
γD =
Ps | hD |2∑K




Ps | hE |2∑L
l=1 Pl | hEl |2 +N0
. (4)
III. SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive analytical expressions for the
average secrecy capacity (ASC) of the system. The maximum
achievable secrecy capacity is defined by [46]
Cs = max {CD − CE , 0} , (5)
where CD = log2 (1 + γD) and CE = log2 (1 + γE) are
the instantaneous capacities of the main and eavesdropping
links, respectively. The secrecy capacity in (5) can therefore
be expressed as [46]
Cs =
{
log2 (1 + γD)− log2 (1 + γE) , γD > γE ,
0, γD ≤ γE .
(6)
The ASC for the system Cs is given by [47]
Cs = E [Cs (γD, γE)]








log2 (1 + γE) f (γE) dγE , (7)
where f (γD) and f (γE) are the probability density func-
tions (PDFs) of γD and γE , respectively. It is worth
noting at this point that the average in (7) is with re-
spect to γD and γE . However, assuming each SINR
term has M RVs, then we would in turn require
at least M -fold numerical integrations to average out
the RVs {gD, gD1 . . . gDK , gE , gE1 . . . gEK , rD,rE , rD1 . . .rDk
and rE1 . . . rEk} contained within each SINR term. Therefore,
obtaining the exact solution of f (γD) and f (γE) would be at
least arduous, if not impossible. However, the computational
complexity of the task is greatly reduced by adopting the MGF
approach, as mentioned earlier.
We commence by expressing the logarithmic function in (6)
in an alternate form. Recalling the identity [48, Eq. (6)]









and by substituting x = γD in (8), we can express the

















After some algebraic manipulations and substituting s =
z
(∑K
k=1 Pk | hDk |2 +N0
)
, we obtain an expression in the























and after taking the expectation, we obtain the average capac-






Ps | hD |2∑K









e−zN0 (MφD (z)−MχD,φD (z)) dz, (11)
























is the joint MGF of the
legitimate link and cumulative interference at D. Using similar









e−zN0 (MφE (z)−MχE ,φE (z)) dz,
(12)
where MφE (z) is the MGF of the cumulative interference at
E andMχE ,φE (z) is the joint MGF of the eavesdropper link
and cumulative interference at E.
From (6), (11) and (12), the alternate form for the ASC in















e−zN0 (MφE (z)−MχE ,φE (z)) dz. (13)
From (13), we observe that the integrals are symmetrical
and differ mainly in the relative locations of S, D and E.
Therefore, this signifies the importance of taking into account
the node locations in the analysis. It is worth noting that, by
definition of the ASC in (6), a zero ASC exists once the second
term in (13), exceeds the value of the first term i.e. the secrecy
of the system is not guaranteed. In what follows, we compute
the MGFs presented in (13).
A. Computation of Moment Generating Functions
1) The MGF MφD (z): The MGF of the cumulative inter-








































Dk frDk (r)fgDk (g)drDkdgDk ,
(14)
where fgDk (g) and frDk (r) are the PDFs of the channel gain




























































π (β − 1)Rβ
 . (18)
Let us start by defining a special case of the MGF in (14)
with only the RVs, given by













−zgDkr−βDk frDk (r)fgDk (g)drDkdgDk ,
(15)
where gDk follows a double-Rayleigh distribution. A double-
Rayleigh RV is by definition the product of two independent
Rayleigh RVs. Thus, we can obtain the PDF of the double-
Rayleigh channel from the generalized n-Rayleigh distribution
[49, Eq. (8)] for n = 2 as








The interferer node distances, rDk , are assumed to be uni-
formly distributed within a circular region, with interference




R2 , 0 < rDk ≤ R,
0, otherwise.
(17)
Using (16) and (17), the MGF in (15) can be expressed as
in (18), shown on the top of the page.
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Therefore, using (54) in (14), we obtain the desired MGF





= {Mψ (zPK)}K , (19)
where the final step in (19) was obtained by assuming identical
transmit powers for interferer nodes, such that P1 = P2 =
· · · = Pk = PK .
2) The Joint MGF MχD,φD (z): The joint MGF
MχD,φD (z) is given by
























=MχD (z)MφD (z) , (20)
whereMφD (z) is given by the expression (19) andMχD (z)
is the MGF of statistics at D. It is worthwhile noting that
the system considered assumes that the location of D is
known by S. Consequently, rD is not random and the MGF
is conditioned only on the statistics of the channel. Thus, the
expected value for the first MGF in (20) can be given by



















To proceed, we express (21) in a more tractable form, by
re-writing the Meijer G-function in an alternate form. Thus,








= gK0 (g) . (22)
Using (22) and [45, Eq. (6.621.3)] along with some basic


























Hence, we obtain MχD,φD (z) by substituting (18), (19)
and (23) in (20).
3) The MGF MφE (z): The MGF of the cumulative inter-










From the definition of the MGF, it can be observed that
the computation of MφE (z) follows similar analysis to the
interference at D. For the sake of brevity, the analysis will
not be repeated here. Thus, using (18), and assuming P1 =
P2 = · · · = Pl = PL, it is easy to show that the desired MGF
is
MφE (z) = {Mψ (zPL)}
L
. (24)
4) The Joint MGF MχE ,φE (z): The joint MGF
MχE ,φE (z) can be obtained through similar analysis
presented in Sec. III-A2. Therefore, from (20),
MχE ,φE (z) = MχE (z)MφE (z), where MφE (z) is
given by (24). For the system under consideration, the exact
location of E is unknown, but lies at a maximum distance
rmax from S. Using the PDFs in (16) and (17), we obtain
























Comparing (25) and (14) shows that both expressions are

































































































































































Ps. Thus, using (18),MχE (z) =Mψ (zPs|rmax). We obtain
from (18) and (24) the following
MχE ,φE (z) =MχE (z)MφE (z)
=Mψ (zPs|rmax) {Mψ (zPL)}L . (26)
Therefore, by substituting the relevant MGFs from (18),
(20), (23), (24) and (26) in (13), we obtain the ASC.
For the special case when the number of interference nodes










































where (a) in (27) was obtained due to the fact that K = L,
PK = PL and thus,MφD (z) =MφE (z) from (19) and (24).
Therefore, the ASC reduces to (28), shown at the top of this
page.
B. The MGF for a Poisson Point Process
In this subsection, we consider the special case when we
have no restriction on the likely distance of an interfering
2This assumption is plausible, because for uniformly distributed interfer-
ence nodes, the number of interference nodes at D and E may remain the
same, while retaining their independence.
mobile node. The interferer effect can be modelled by a
Poisson process, when we assume that the spatial locations
of the vehicular nodes are uniformly distributed [51]. In this
case, the interferer radius R → ∞ as well as the number of
interferer nodes at D, K →∞. We can then define the average
interferers per unit area λ = KπR2 (interferers/m
2), such that
0 < λ < ∞. Then, from (14) and (53), the MGF for the
cumulative interference can be represented as












β Γ(1− 2β ), (29)
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix B.
It can be observed that (29) corresponds to the Pois-
son MGF with interferer density, λ. From (29), we





β Γ(1− 2β )gDK0 (gD) dgD. For path-loss exponent
β = 4, we can straightforwardly obtain a closed-form solution
for the MGF using [52, Eq. (2.16.8.8)]. After some algebraic
manipulations, we obtain (30) at the top of the next page,






C. Approximate Secrecy Capacity
In this section, we present an approximate solution to the
ASC computed in (28) in order to provide a more direct
solution. From (6), it can be seen that the secrecy capacity
is defined as a logarithmic function. Thus, we can define an
approximate solution to (28) by invoking Jensen’s inequal-
ity3 [53, pp. 453] and applying to the expressions for the
instantaneous capacities of the main and eavesdropping links.
Therefore, the average capacity at D is
E [log2 (1 + γD)] ≤ log2 (1 + E [γD])
3Jensen’s inequality asserts that, if f (x) is a convex function, then
E [f (X)] ≥ f (E [X]), provided that the expectations exist and are finite.

























































































where γD is defined in (3) and the expectation term on















. By using (22), the first expectation




















where (b) in (32) was obtained with the aid of [45, Eq.








































where (c) in (33) was obtained with the help of [45, Eq.
(8.312.2)] and (d) was obtained by invoking Jensen’s inequal-
ity. Next, the expectation in (33) can be obtained for the
independent RVs. The expectation E [gDk ] is derived using




is obtained using the
PDF in (17) and the monotonicity of the expectation operator4.
Therefore, we obtain the approximation as










Thus, (31) resolves to the approximate expression for the















Using similar analysis to the derivation of (35) while
considering the uncertainty of the eavesdropper location with
4monotonicity depicts that if the RVs X ≤ Y , then E [X] ≤ E [Y ].
maximum radius, rmax, we obtain a bounded expression for













































It is worth noting that, in addition to the fact that (37)
is in closed-form with elementary functions, the expression
also lends itself much easier to analysis as compared to (28).
From observation of (37), it can be seen that the interferer
affects both the eavesdropper and the destination receiver. The
accuracy of the approximate ASC expression is discussed in
Sec. V.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we derive expressions for the SOP. The SOP
can be defined as the probability that the secrecy capacity falls
below a target secrecy rate [39]. This can be represented as
Po = Pr [Cs < Rs] , (38)
where Rs is the pre-determined target secrecy rate. From (6)




















Ps | hD |2∑K
k=1 Pk | hDk |2 +N0
< ν − 1 + ν
(
Ps | hE |2∑L
l=1 Pl | hEl |2 +N0
)]
, (39)
where ν = 2Rs and (e) follows from substituting (3) and (4).








































where c = Psr
−β





, while the RVs











+N0. Assuming the special case, where
the number of interference nodes K = L, then line (f) in (40)
follows from the fact that the average cumulative interference
at both D and E, MφD (z) = MφE (z) as shown in Sec.
III-A.
Since X follows a double-Rayleigh distribution given in
(16), using the PDF representation in (22), we can express Po
as the CDF of X given by
Po = 1−ΘK1 (Θ) , (41)
where Θ = Y (ν−1)c + νWcr.
To obtain the average SOP, we express the Bessel function
term in a more tractable form. Using [45, Eq. (8.432.5)] and
utilizing the fact that sΓ (s) = Γ (1 + s), we get



































︸ ︷︷ ︸ dt,
J2
(42)
where (g) was obtained by invoking [45, Eq. (1.313.5)].
To evaluate J1 in (42), we note that the RVs Y and W are
independent. Hence, the expectation of the second cosine term
in J1 can be obtained with the aid of [45, Eq. (6.699.4)] and






































To evaluate the expectation of the first term in (43), we
re-express the cosine function in a more tractable form by




































ϕ (−it) e−itcνN0 + ϕ (it) eitcνN0
]
, (44)
where cf = 2F1
(
















is computed in Appendix C.
The term J2 in (42) can be obtained using [45, Eq.
(6.699.3)] and the PDF form in (22). The expectation of the
second sine term in J2 can be obtained as
E [sin (νWcrt)] =
∞̂
0

































where (h) in (45) was obtained using [45, Eq. (9.121.1)] and












































ϕ (it) eitcνN0 − ϕ (−it) e−itcνN0
]
, (46)




, while ϕ (−it) and ϕ (it) are given
in (47) and (48), respectively, shown at the top of the next
page.
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix C.
Using (42), (44), (46), (47) and (48), the average SOP of
the system reduces to (49), shown at the top of the next page.
A. High SINR Secrecy Outage Probability Approximation
In this section, we present an approximate solution to the



























where X = gD, ν = 2Rs , while γD and γE are defined in




5This approximation is commonly used in the literature for such analysis
(see [31], [32] and the references therein). The approximation becomes more





















 π (itcνPKR−β) β−2β
























































































 π (−itcνPKR−β) β−2β





























































































































− ϕ (−it) exp
(







Given X follows a double-Rayleigh distribution, then the









νg2EcrK0 (gE)K1 (νgEcr) dgE
(n)
= 1−














. Line (m) in (51) was obtained by
observing that the summation terms cancel out in (l) of
(50), while (n) was obtained by invoking [45, Eq. (6.576.4)]




















Comparing (49) and (52), it can be observed that, at
high SINR regimes, the average SOP can be simplified and
expressed in elementary functions, independently of the inter-
ference terms. Thus, this approximation lends itself to secrecy
analysis based on the relative locations of the vehicular nodes
only and allows for better insight into the performance of the
system. The term cr therefore, which is a ratio between the
distances of interest, is an important metric for the SOP.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present and discuss some results from
the mathematical expressions derived in the paper. We then
investigate the effect of key parameters on the ASC of the sys-
tem. Monte Carlo simulations were conducted on MATLAB
software package with at least 105 iterations, while numerical
expressions were plotted on Mathematica package. However,
most common mathematical packages can be used to plot the
expressions. Unless otherwise stated, we have assumed source
power Ps = 10 W, interferer transmit power PK = 10 W,
source to destination (S-to-D) distance rD = 4 m, maximum
eavesdropper distance rmax = 10 m, maximum interferer
distance R = 20 m and path-loss exponent β = 2.7.
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Figure 2: ASC versus number of interferers K = L, with varied
maximum eavesdropper radius rmax.
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4












































 = 25 m (analytical)
 r
max
 = 15 m (analytical)
 r
max
 = 10 m (analytical)
known  r
E
 = 10 m (analytical)
 P
s
 = 10 W
 P
s
 = 20 W
Figure 3: ASC versus source to destination (S-to-D) link for varied
source transmit power Ps and known eavesdropper distance rE .
A. Average Secrecy Capacity
In this subsection, we examine the ASC of the proposed sys-
tem. In Fig. 2, we present a plot of the ASC against the number
of interfering sources in the network, for both the approximate
and exact analytical expressions. The approximate curves were
plotted from the expression derived in Eq. (37), while the exact
analytical curves were obtained from the expression derived
in Eq. (28). We observe that the approximations converge
towards the exact analytical solution with increased presence
of interfering vehicles. However, given the disparity, the exact
solutions are preferable for more precise analysis, while the
approximations are valid in analyzing the effect of the various
network parameters, due to the similar trends with easier
mathematical tractability. It can be further observed from the
results that the number of active interfering nodes have a
negative impact on the ASC, with the ASC rapidly decreasing
with interference. Moreover, this impact can be effective at
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Figure 4: ASC versus source transmit power Ps for varied interferer
numbers K = L and maximum interferer distances R.
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Figure 5: ASC versus source transmit power Ps for varied interferer
density λ[interferers/m2] and source to eavesdropper distances rE .
various eavesdropper distances from the node, as seen when
rmax is increased. It should be noted that the parameter rmax
is a proxy for the uncertainty of E’s location. In a practical
scenario, a vehicle is more likely to know the location of D in
which it establishes communication with, as against a passive
eavesdropper whose presence may not be known. Therefore,
we assume both D and E are always within the radius rmax,
while the interferer nodes are restricted by a larger outer radius
of R. The increased secrecy observed when rmax increases
indicates that when E is more likely to be closer to S-to-D
V2V link, then the secrecy is compromised, and vice versa.
The next figure will further demonstrate the importance of
rmax and the relative distances of the nodes to the ASC.
Fig. 3 shows a plot of the ASC against the S-to-D distance
rD, with different values of Ps and rmax. We assume R =
40m and 5 interfering nodes. First, we observe that the ASC
decreases as D moves away from S, which is expected because
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 r
E




 = 10W (Analytical, Eq. (48))
 r
E




 = 30W (Analytical, Eq. (48))
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Figure 6: SOP versus Threshold Rs for varied eavesdropper distances
rE and source transmit power Ps.
the SINR at D is also decreasing. Next, we see the effect
of increasing the maximum range of E. At the different Ps
values, we observe that increasing rmax improves the ASC
because this means the likely radius of finding E is extended.
However, as rmax is reduced, the ASC rapidly decreases and
reaches zero approximately when rmax = 2rD. This shows
the significance of the relative locations of S, D and E. To
further demonstrate this, we assume a known location for E
and use this distance rE to illustrate the significance of our
result with respect to interferer impact on secrecy. We assume
rE = 10m and plot the exact ASC for the V2V network,
through simulations. From Fig. 3, it can be observed that the
ASC for known rE is much superior to the case when E’s
location is uncertain. In fact, from our analysis, it is clear
that the ASC at rE = 10m is equivalent to the ASC when
rmax = 25m within the region studied. This therefore signifies
the importance of taking into account the uncertainty of the
location of E, especially for the security analysis of passive
eavesdroppers, when the eavesdropper is unlikely to give away
its position by transmissions.
In Fig. 4, we present the ASC with respect to Ps for differ-
ent number of interfering nodes K and maximum interferer
range R. As expected, the ASC increases monotonically with
increased Ps. Furthermore, within the region investigated, the
ASC is highest without any interfering nodes and degrades
with more active interfering nodes, as already demonstrated
in the previous figure. Additionally, it can be observed that
for the same number of interferers, increasing R, improves
the ASC of the system. Given that both S and E are affected
by the interference in the network, then an increased radius of
interferers, reduces the density of interfering nodes, which in
turn improves the ASC.
In Fig. 5, we examine the effect of interference for the case
when the number of vehicular nodes are random (unknown). In
practice, this is a more realistic scenario albeit the complexity
of the analysis is increased due to the addition of another
RV. For this case, we model a Poisson point process with the
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Figure 7: SOP versus source to eavesdropper (S-to-E) link for varied
source transmit power Ps.
interferer (vehicle) density parameter λ representing interferers
per unit area. The figure depicts a plot of the ASC against the
source transmit power, with different values of interference
density λ and source to eavesdropper (S-to-E) distance rE .
We assume path-loss exponent β = 4, fixed eavesdropper
distances rE = 8m and 12m, as well as interferer densities
λ = 0.01 and 0.02 interferer/m2. The analytical ASC was
obtained using (27) along with (30) for the first MGF term
and (23) for the third MGF term. For fixed rE , the second
MGF is obtained using (23), while substituting rD = rE ,














Considering Fig. 5, we can observe that the case with no
interference (i.e. λ = 0) provides the highest ASC rate, as
expected. As the interferer density increases, at fixed values
of rE and Ps, we observe that the ASC rate decreases due to
the effect of interference. Additionally, we consider a known
and fixed rE in order to determine the effect of increasing the
relative distances of S-to-D link compared to S-to-E link. It
can be observed that the ASC increases when rE is increased
and this effect is more pronounced when Ps is greater. For
instance, at λ = 0, when Ps increases from 5W to 30W, the
ASC increases by as much as 0.7 bits/s/Hz between values for
rE = 2rD = 8m and rE = 3rD = 12m. In fact, increasing
Ps (or equivalently increasing SIR) results in better ASC at
all values of rE and λ.
B. Average Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we present results for the average SOP
of the system from both the approximate and exact analytical
expressions. The approximate curves were plotted from the
approximate high SINR bounds derived in Eq. (52), while
the exact analytical curves were obtained from the expression
derived in Eq. (49). In Fig. 6, the SOP is plotted against the
threshold values of the secrecy rate, Rs, for different values of
the source power and eavesdropper distance. Specific values
employed are rD = 4m, K = L = 1 and R = 10m. From
the plot, we observe that the approximate expressions provide
a lower bound for the exact expressions and are tighter at
higher SINR (i.e. Ps = 30W) with rE = 2rD = 8m. This
indicates that for high SINR regimes, the effect of the network
parameters can be closely monitored using the more tractable
approximate expressions. We further observe that the SOP
increases steadily as the threshold rate increases. Similarly, the
outage probability increases when the eavesdropper is closer
to the source as well as when the source power decreases,
i.e. lower SINR. Thus, the secrecy threshold rate needs to be
selected while taking into consideration the effects of possible
eavesdropper location in the network and SINR rates, in order
to minimize the outage.
In Fig. 7, we study the SOP as a function of the S-to-
E distance, for different values of the source power and
interference. While varying rE , we normalized the S-to-D
distance, such that rD = 1m. As expected, the SOP is observed
to monotonically decrease as rE increases. This indicates that
the increased relative distance between the nodes improves
the secrecy and thereby reduces the possibility of outage.
Additionally, we observe that increased interference or reduced
source power, increases the probability of secrecy outage.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examined the impact of interference on
the PLS of a wireless vehicular communication network, by
analyzing the ASC and SOP of the system. Due to the nature
of the network and statistics of the SINR, we reduced the
complexity of the solution by expressing the ASC in terms
of the MGF of the RVs representing the joint fading and
random distances of interfering nodes, and eavesdropper node.
Similarly, we expressed the SOP in terms of the characteristic
function of the joint interferer statistics RVs. Thereafter, we
found closed-form expressions for the various MGFs and
characteristic functions, which were then used to analyze
the performance of the system in terms of the considered
performance metrics. The results demonstrated the effect of
some key system parameters such as the distances of the
V2V nodes and eavesdropper node, as well as the number
and distances of interfering nodes. The results showed the
importance of the analysis with respect to considering uncer-
tainty of the eavesdropper location. Particularly, the maximum
range of E, indicates the level of uncertainty on E’s location
and reducing this radius reduces the ASC, while assuming a
known eavesdropper location significantly improves the ASC.
The results also showed that for both the ASC and SOP, the
presence of interfering nodes reduce the achievable secrecy of
the system, thereby further highlighting the importance of our
analysis.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EQ. (18)
Upon invoking [45, Eq. (2.33.10)] along with some mathe-
matical manipulations (for β > 2),6 the inner integral in (14)
resolves to
6For β > 2, only the free-space model (β = 2) is excluded. Hence, this








































































which after several manipulations can be expressed as in (18).
It is worth noting that, using [45, Eq. (6.621.3)], the second
integral term in (54) reduces to the first term in (18), while
using [52, Eq. (2.16.61.1)] and the Bessel representation of
the PDF in (22), we can express the first integral in (54) as
the last 3 terms in (18).
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF EQ. (29)
From (14) and (53), the MGF for the cumulative interfer-
ence can be represented as
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By using [54, Eq. (4.2.23)] and the fact that Γ (s) = Γ (s, 0),
then (55) becomes























where the final line in (56) was obtained by invoking [45, Eq.
(1.211.4)].
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF EQS. (47) AND (48)
The characteristic functions are defined in (44) and (46).
We first evaluate ϕ (−it), thus





































gkK0 (gk) dgk, (57)
where (j) in (57) was obtained using [45, Eq. (2.33.10)].
By invoking [52, Eq. (2.16.61.1)] along with some algebraic
manipulations, ϕ (−it) can be evaluated as in (47).









using similar analysis to the derivation of (47). Thus, using
[52, Eq. (2.16.61.1)] along with some algebraic manipulations,
a closed-form expression for ϕ (it) can be obtained as in (48).
This completes the proof.
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